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Boredom, the Life Course, and Late Modernity 
Understanding Subjectivity and Sociality of ‘Dead Time’ Experiences 
Benedikt Rogge 
Abstract 
For empirical time and life course researchers, boredom experiences constitute a high-
ly interesting research subject. Based on three qualitative interview studies, this article 
delivers a phenomenological approximation to boredom and describes two distinct 
types of boredom experience, namely “situational boredom” and “agentic boredom” 
both of which are theorised from the perspective of sociological practice theory. Fo-
cusing on the experience of “agentic boredom”, the paper analyses its connections to 
life stages, life transitions and life-long socialisation processes. Finally, current socio-
historical conditions are taken into account and it is suggested that agentic boredom is 
perhaps an emotion symptomatic of late modernity.  
 
Langeweile, Lebenslauf, und Spätmoderne 
Zur Subjektivität und Sozialität des Erlebens von ‚toter Zeit’ 
Zusammenfassung 
Für empirische Zeit- und Lebenslaufforscher ist Langeweile ein höchst interessanter 
Forschungsgegenstand. Unter Rückgriff auf drei qualitative Interviewstudien liefert 
der Artikel eine phänomenologische Annäherung an Langeweile und beschreibt zwei 
grundsätzlich zu unterscheidende Typen der Erfahrung von Langeweile, nämlich 
„situationsbezogene Langeweile“ und „handlungsbezogene Langeweile“. Beide Ty-
pen werden aus der Perspektive der soziologischen Praxistheorie durchdrungen. Der 
Artikel beschränkt sich im Folgenden auf das Erleben handlungsbezogener Langewei-
le und analysiert ihre Zusammenhänge mit Lebensphasen, Transitionen und Sozialisa-
tionsprozessen. Abschließend wird auf die gegenwärtigen soziokulturellen Bedingun-
gen eingegangen und die These formuliert, dass es sich bei der handlungsbezogenen 
Langeweile um eine für die Spätmoderne symptomatische Emotion handelt. 
  
Boredom, the Life Course, and Late Modernity 285 
Introduction 
Much has been said on the subject of boredom. Key commentators have ranged from 
philosophers such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger, psychoanalysts 
and psychologists such as Freud, Fromm, and Frankl, to sociologists including Marx, 
Simmel, Wolf Lepenies and Anton Zijderveld. Indeed, boredom has been thought of 
as a truly modern phenomenon and throughout modernity has largely been considered 
as a problem, nuisance, or even pathology.1  
Today, boredom seems to be more present than ever in people’s everyday lives. 
However, to date there appears to be no valid longitudinal study confirming this im-
pression.2 Nonetheless, public discourses continuously point to an increased preva-
lence of boredom with the growing pervasiveness of the notions of “happiness” and 
“well-being” in the media, politics, economics, and academia accompanying an in-
creasing intolerance towards the experience of boredom (Rogge 2011). More often 
than not boredom, appears as the antagonist to the happiness and flow experiences 
many contemporary Western individuals strive for (Csikszentmihalyi 1975). Thus, 
combating the presence of boredom may indeed be of primary concern to a rising 
number of people in late modernity.  
There is a need for social scientists to thoroughly research boredom as a social 
phenomenon. In particular, the need is to overcome psychological reductionisms that 
focus on an individual’s propensity to experience boredom and neglect contextual 
parameters (e.g. Mikulas/Vodanovich 1993) as well as sociological reductionisms that 
overstate the role of cultural parameters in boredom by ignoring the dimension of 
individual agency and interpretation (e.g. Klapp 1986). In this article, I analyse bore-
dom within the interplay of both individual and contextual processes as unfolding 
throughout the life course. 
Following a brief outline of the empirical studies that this article draws on, I deliv-
er a phenomenological approximation to boredom and then go on to differentiate two 
distinct types, i.e. “situational boredom” and “agentic boredom”, theorising them 
from the perspective of sociological practice theory. Subsequently, I show how the 
experience of agentic boredom relates to characteristics of the life course. Finally, I 
discuss the issue of agentic boredom in the sociocultural context of late modernity.  
 
Three qualitative studies on boredom 
This article is based on the findings of three qualitative studies. All three studies used 
semi-structured interviews for their data collection (Witzel 2000) and classical coding 
techniques to analyse the fully transcribed interviews (Coffey/Atkinson 1996). The 
first study was conducted in 2004 with eleven, mainly undergraduate, students of a 
British university. The sample consisted of six women and five men, aged 19 to 25. 
The two central topics of the interviews were the experience of boredom and the stu-
dents’ everyday lives. The second study was executed in 2005. It included ten male, 
                                                          
1 Boredom has been described as correlate and predictor of social deviance such as low school perfor-
mance (e.g. Robinson 1975) and violent behaviour (e.g. Bartone 2005), as well as impaired psychoso-
matic and physical health (Sommers/Vodanovich 2000). 
2 Studies contending, for instance, that the number of bored people in West-Germany had increased from 
26% in 1952 to 38% in 1978 (Iso-Ahola/Weissinger 1987, 357) cannot be relied upon. Only representa-
tive household panel studies can deliver appropriate evidence. 
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German, long-term unemployed aged 45 to 60. This study dealt with daily time struc-
tures and time experiences paying particular attention to the emergence of boredom. 
The third study, carried out in Germany in the years 2008 and 2009, was a longitudi-
nal study with 25 short-term unemployed participants in mid-adulthood (13 women 
and 12 men, aged 30 to 45) whom I interviewed some eight months after job loss and 
again ca. eight months later. The focus of this study was on the interviewees’ identity 
process and mental health. Again, a major part of the interviews included descriptions 




First of all, the three studies delivered evidence on the question: What is boredom? In 
fact, in the literature, there is a ubiquitous fuzziness as to the notion of boredom (Vo-
danovich 2003, 570). Rather than delivering a clear-cut, precise, definition of what 
boredom is, I will subsequently depict core aspects of how boredom is experienced.4 
According to the interviewees and existing research, I would like to suggest a mini-
mal consensus of what constitutes the distinct experience of boredom. The suggestion 
contains four components. The experience of boredom is characterised by (1) the 
subject’s perception of a lack of contrast, (2) the subject’s slowed perception of time 
passage, (3) the subject’s increased awareness of the situation or the self and (4) a 
manifest negative feeling in the subject. 
The first point stresses the subjectivity of the phenomenon. In fact, the experience 
of boredom varies enormously from person to person. Besides, the first aspect inte-
grates disparate accounts of boredom describing it as a “lack”: that is a “lack” of 
“arousal”, “interest”, “meaning” or “motivation”. This links the deficit character of 
boredom to the basic category of contrast experience (similarly Brissett/Snow 1993). 
Bet it at the cognitive, emotional or physiological level: The construction and percep-
tion of contrast is a fundamental part of human life, as Zerubavel (1993) has so astute-
ly shown and, I would like to add, a basic human need. Note that the initial perception 
of a lack of contrast, be it at a family occasion, at work or on a lonely Sunday, typical-
ly entails a “restless and irritable feeling” in the subject (Barbalet 1999, 635). This 
restlessness indicates a need for change, for a rebalancing of one’s contrast experienc-
es.  
The second component of boredom includes a perception of “protracted duration” 
(Flaherty 1991). During interviews, respondents reported that being bored meant that 
“time drags”, “time stretches” or that time was experienced as “empty time” or “dead 
time”. In their perception time does not move on as they themselves do not experience 
movement. Accordingly, one of the most typical statements is to “feel stuck”. All of 
these descriptions reflect a slow-motion effect in the perception of time passage that 
other studies (Danckert/Allman 2005; Mikulas/Vodanovich 1993) have also demon-
strated to be symptomatic of boredom. Note that the slowed time perception relates 
                                                          
3 Details on methodology and other characteristics of these studies can be found in earlier publications 
(e.g. Rogge/Kuhnert/Kastner 2007) or directly be obtained from me. 
4 See Martin/Sadlo/Stew (2006) for the phenomenological character of qualitative boredom research. 
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not to the retrospective judgment of life time (e.g. “These months have flown by”) but 
to the current experience of everyday time.5 
The third element of the boredom experience is the subject’s increased awareness 
of the situation or the self. When experiencing boredom people find they “must do 
what [they] do not want to do” (Fenichel 1951, 359) or they feel they “do not know 
what to do” at all. These two very different sensations have one commonality: from 
the subject’s perspective, the situation does not entail “cognitive engrossment” (Fla-
herty 1991, 82). Rather than being fully involved in the on-going situation, subjects 
are distancing themselves from it either hoping that the situation will soon be over or 
wondering what else they could be doing. In both cases, subjects display a character-
istically increased awareness of the situation or themselves. As psychological time 
research interestingly indicates, this awareness can be thought of as a “cognitive dis-
fluency” in the flow of cognitions leading to the slowed perception of time passage 
described above (Wittmann 2009). 
The fourth characteristic of boredom is a manifest negative feeling occurring in 
the subject. Boredom is an emotion (Barbalet 1999) and emotions do play a highly 
significant role in time perception.6 The negative valence of this emotion is rooted in 
the subject’s perception of a discrepancy between a desired situation, e.g. going out 
with one’s friends, and the real situation, e.g. having to attend a university class (Kern 
2009, 118). In contrast to some other authors (Doehlemann 1991), I do not conceive 
of any positive aspects of boredom as an emotion. Although some interviewees did 
enumerate positive aspects of boredom, these rather referred to situations framed as 
“relaxation”, “calmness” and the like, or to events or actions following the experience 
of boredom such as “inspiration” and “creativity”. However, these phenomena must 
be differentiated from the emotion itself. 
 
“Situational boredom” and “agentic boredom” from the perspective of 
sociological practice theory 
In what follows, I will differentiate two distinct types of boredom experience and 
theorise them from the perspective of sociological practice theory. As mentioned 
earlier, boredom evokes a feeling of restlessness and the need to rebalance one’s con-
trast experiences. Whenever this is impossible, people become, or remain, bored. 
However, the experience of boredom and the characteristic feeling of “being stuck” 
(Laura, student) can, in the subject’s eyes, occur for two highly disparate reasons: it 
can either be attributed to the external situation; or it can be traced back to oneself. 
The former case is exemplified by situations such as having to wait for the delayed 
bus or having to listen to some dull dialogue partner. The latter emerges, for example, 
when lying in bed or being stuck to a terribly boring TV programme. The interview 
data yielded a systematic difference between these two types which I call “situational 
                                                          
5 Opposed to this, some scholars have suggested that life time during which one is bored is perceived as 
passing more quickly (Svendsen 2005, 52-59). Yet, this observation relates to a global evaluation of 
(the meaninglessness of) one’s life rather than the experience of everyday time. 
6 Wittmann (2009; 1956) even speaks of a recent “emotive turn” in time research stressing that the expe-
rience of time is intricately bound up with the subject’s emotional states and reactions. 
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boredom”7 and “agentic boredom”. I will outline their characteristics while drawing 
on sociological practice theory and the sociology of time.  
Sociological practice theory (Reckwitz 2002) assembles a group of recent theoret-
ical approaches; it is best known through the works of Anthony Giddens and Pierre 
Bourdieu. There are four major reasons why sociological practice theory is useful to 
analyse and understand boredom experiences:  
(a) At its heart lies the notion of social practices that are repetitive everyday rou-
tines which are “simply done” (Giddens 1984, 7). That is to say, from the subject’s 
perspective, they are conducted in the mode of a “practical consciousness” (ibid.), in a 
tacit, taken-for-granted manner. Besides, practices are considered as “bodily-mental 
routines” (Reckwitz 2002, 256) including the subject’s knowledge stocks and pro-
cesses of meaning-making on the one hand and action parameters on the other. As an 
emotion that emerges in everyday life, boredom can adequately be addressed with the 
notion of practices.  
(b) Practice theory seeks to overcome the structure-agency and micro-macro di-
chotomies that have dominated sociological theorising for so long. It thus supplies 
theoretical devices for looking at the interplay of agentic processes on the one hand, 
and structural and contextual parameters on the other. This helps to get over cultural 
and structural reductionisms as well as psychological reductionisms. Linking practice 
theory to the concerns of time sociology, this includes the analysis of the interplay of 
sociotemporal structures and individual interpretations as well as agentic “time work” 
(Flaherty 2011). The notion of “time work” stems from Flaherty and refers to at-
tempts to “modify or customize one’s own experience of time or that of others” (Fla-
herty 2011, 26). It also includes, I argue, skills to fabricate contrast experiences and 
avoid boredom. Besides, the constraining and enabling qualities of sociotemporal 
structures can be analysed along the three, only analytically distinguishable, modali-
ties of structuration as suggested by Giddens (1984). These are processes of significa-
tion (social meanings), legitimation (social norms) and domination (power relations). 
(c) A further characteristic feature of practice theory is that it suggests conceiving 
of social structures not only as external to the subject but also as operating from with-
in the subject: that is as rules and schemes. Giddens (1984, 17) speaks of “memory 
traces orienting the agent’s conduct”. Bourdieu (1977) has emphasised that subjects 
acquire and internalise these rules and schemes (habitus) throughout their socialisa-
tion and that they are unequally distributed across social groups. This idea can be 
connected to the assumption of time sociology that subjects’ perceptions of time as 
well as their time work capacities differ across social groups (e.g. Tismer 1985).  
(d) Finally, practice theory, in particular Giddens’ structuration theory, proposes a 
connection between the exercise of social practices and psychological experience. 
Giddens (1984, 3) stresses that activities constitute a “continuity of practices”, an 
ever-on-going cycle of action. This continuity is deemed central to the individual’s 
identity process. In fact, the individual is thought of as “the unique crossing point of 
practices” (Reckwitz 2002, 256). As is well-known, Giddens (1984) emphasises that 
all individuals are motivated to maintain the continuous flow of practices so as to 
maintain the experience of “ontological security”. A rupture of the continuous exer-
cise of practices, by contrast, is experienced as a threat to the feeling of ontological 
                                                          
7 The term “situational boredom” was first suggested by Doehlemann (1991). 
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security. This is why everyday practices and individual self-experience and self-
portrayal are closely connected. Particularly the experience of agentic boredom, as we 
shall see, represents a sense of “practical disfluency” that is intricately intertwined 
with the individual’s identity process and impairs the feeling of ontological security.  
 
Situational boredom 
For an exemplary description of situational boredom, consider Musharbash’s (2007) 
ethnographic account of a mourning ritual amongst Warlpiri people. The Australian 
aborigines referred to are bound to continue mourning due to the social norms of the 
community (Musharbash 2007, 311):  
 
The key-mourners were exhausted from wailing, it was incredibly hot, and the 
news was that the mourners from Alice Springs wouldn‘t arrive until Saturday 
[to complete the ritual], meaning four more days in the hot sun with nothing to 
do but wailing, being exhausted, grieving. 
 
Albeit an external description rather than the account of subjective experience, this 
passage illustrates the character of situational boredom. In situational boredom sub-
jects feel bored “with” or “by” something or somebody: that is they feel constrained 
by the situation. In the example of the Warlpiri mourners, boredom arises because of 
the nature of the very monotonous activity that cannot be abandoned because of 
community norms. Therefore, in situational boredom the situation itself requires me 
to do something I do not want to do. The respective sociotemporal constraints can, 
according to the subject’s perception, be contingent upon constellations of meaning, 
social norms or power (Giddens, 1984). For instance, somebody might feel stuck in a 
conversation with somebody coming from a culture in which, according to my per-
ception, interrupting an interlocutor is considered extremely impolite (signification). 
Thus, they keep listening. Somebody else could also be trapped in a boring conversa-
tion because their girl-friend expects them to listen carefully to minute details of her 
day, otherwise she will start yelling (legitimation). Finally, it could be a conversation 
with one’s boss who has to decide on extending my working contract next week 
(power asymmetry).  
As interviewees describe, situational boredom is often perceived as a prison or a 
“cage” (Martin/Sadlo/Stew 2006) stressing the presence of situational constraints. 
Note that in situational boredom the situation does not need to be meaningless to the 
bored subject as other authors have argued (e.g. Barbalet 1999). In fact, it might be 
very meaningful for me to keep babysitting my own child or listening to the mono-
logues of my mother-in-law. It is not the meaninglessness but the lack of contrast 
inherent to the situation that bores me. 
It is important to acknowledge that according to the subject’s perception, the situa-
tion is clearly defined. As to the subject’s conduct, when experiencing situational 
boredom, interviewees say they feel forced to take on a passive role (e.g. of the pa-
tient listener) while cognitively distancing themselves from it (e.g. by wondering 
when the situation ends). While the flow of (social) activities continues, the subject is 
in the position of waiting for the end of the situation thus becoming oriented towards 
the future. Often interviewees portray themselves as the unhappy or alienated victims 
of a specific situation. However, there is no essential damage to the subject’s feeling 
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of “ontological security” as the flow of action still continues. The identity process is 
deflated but not necessarily impaired.  
 
Agentic boredom 
The second type, the experience of agentic boredom, is described in the following 
passage on an everyday, occidental, experience (Martin/Sadlo/Stew 2006, 203): 
 
And I‘ll start fidgeting, and I‘ll get up, go to the toilet, go and have a glass of 
orange juice […] go and put my washing on or whatever, I‘ll come back five 
minutes later, carry on being bored […] I‘m just going to get up and do some-
thing for the sake of doing it.  
 
In this type of situation boredom arises not because of situational constraints but, 
quite the reverse, in the middle of situational undeterminedness. Here, the subject 
perceives not a maximum but a minimum of situational restrictions and a maximum 
of “enabling potential”. Time is not experienced within a “cage” but as “free time”. 
The feeling that the situation is not clearly defined is the actual problem. The subject 
perceives barely any normative, significative or power-related constraints in the situa-
tion. He or she does “not know what to do” and, as in the example, starts to do some-
thing “for the sake of doing it”. The sentence “You sort of don‘t know what to do 
with yourself” (Paul, student) epitomises the experience of agentic boredom. The 
subject cannot attribute any meaning to the current situation nor draw on any action 
scheme to “go on”. The feeling of “stuckness” here is not a feeling of being dominat-
ed by heteronomic forces as in situational boredom, but the sensation of a failure to 
live out autonomy. This is felt as a practical void and an interpretive vacuum. In terms 
of practice theory, people feel there are neither internal nor external structures to draw 
upon to ultimately balance their contrast experiences. This leads to an interruption of 
the continuous flow of action.  
This interruption of the continuity of practices engenders the “uneasy sensation”, 
the “stagnant, nagging feeling” (Mary, student) that accompanies agentic boredom. 
This, as has been suggested, impairs the feeling of ontological security for when expe-
riencing agentic boredom subjects cannot, as it were, locate themselves. Lacking any 
definition of the situation and any script of what to do, the subject, albeit only instant-
ly, lacks the “basis for seeing who [she is]” (Hewitt 2003, 63).  
Agentic boredom typically occurs in leisure time that is unstructured, “bulk” time 
in which there are relatively few external constraints and higher degrees of freedom to 
choose when compared to other “time regimes” such as work and family (Luckmann 
1983). Thus, agentic boredom is characteristically attributed to oneself, not to external 
parameters. Subjects become self-conscious and consciously address their “being 
stuck”. This reflexivity is symptomatic of agentic boredom. If the feeling is persistent 
or repetitive, some people turn to portraying themselves as a “failure”, feeling they do 
not accomplish time work in any satisfactory way. This is what makes agentic bore-
dom “nagging” to many people. Here also lies the potential association with the de-
velopment of pathological symptoms such as depressive symptoms when boredom 
experiences keep reoccurring. This is because the experience of agentic boredom 
interferes with the self, appearing as a, albeit often bearable, hiatus of the identity 
process and reducing the subject’s feeling of ontological security. 
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In these moments, subjects are not oriented towards the future as in situational 
boredom (“when is the situation over?”) but are absorbed by a seemingly never-
ending present (“what shall I do now?”). At the level of conduct, agentic boredom 
does not go along with a position of waiting. Rather, the behavioural response, as seen 
in the example above, is erratic. Many people refer to it as “killing time”. This term 
stands for all attempts to disperse the perceived unpleasant “vacuum” and to over-
come disfluency in the identity process. “Killing time” includes all sorts of activities 
from the “fidgeting” mentioned earlier and a restless enchainment of meaningless 
activities to apathetic lying in bed, sitting in an armchair and, mostly, “doing nothing 
in particular” (Emily, student). All sorts of thoughts, associations, mental fragments, 
action attempts etc. may emerge in this praxeological void. However, when the situa-
tion is framed in any specific way and a script for any bodily-mental routine activated, 
the actual experience of agentic boredom ends.  
 
Agentic boredom across the life course 
So far, I have focused on characteristics of the experience of agentic boredom. I now 
proceed to analysing its relationship with the life course. Life course sociology and 
the sociology of time are united in the endeavour to transcend reductionisms in social 
theory and to investigate “the interplay of human lives and historical times” (Elder 
1994, 5). In the following, I show how the experience of agentic boredom relates to 
life stages, life transitions, as well as habitus formation and life-long socialisation 
processes. 
 
Agentic boredom and life stages  
Agentic boredom occurs in the relative absence of temporal constraints. Temporal 
constraints obviously vary throughout one’s life, primarily depending on work and 
family commitments. Based on the institutionalisation of work biographies, Kohli 
(1986) suggests a tripartite character of the life course consisting of the pre-work 
stage, a working stage, and a retirement stage. While some psychologists have con-
tended that boredom experiences would decrease with growing age (Miku-
las/Vodanovich 1993), this linear assumption does not make sense from a life course 
perspective. This can be explained by the fact that in most biographies temporal con-
straints are most pronounced in the working stage of life. This is due to the “time 
regime” that work imposes but also to the temporal routines and schedules that go 
along with family life (Rogge 2009).  
While we do not yet possess representative, large-scale data on the variation of 
boredom experiences across the life course (Kern 2009, 71-80), my interviews reflect 
how many agentic boredom experiences emerge in life stages that are characterised 
by weak sociotemporal constraints. Some of the students I interviewed make clear 
that they perceive the fact that their “time-scale is not dictated to [them] by other 
people” (Jason, student) and that their “days vary so much” (Sarah, student) as a chal-
lenge and a source of agentic boredom. Similar findings have been reported for peo-
ple out of the labour market (Rogge/Kuhnert/Kastner 2007). However, the sociotem-
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poral constraints of work are not the only determinants of boredom experiences.8 
Consider, for instance, the contrasting examples of two students both of whom face 
comparable temporal restrictions in their everyday life, including a similar financial 
situation:  
 
I am a very spontaneous person. […] One minute I might be studying and 
thinking, ‘Oh, let‘s go and do this,’ or I do that or whatever. (Emily, student) 
 
It was getting up, lectures, coffee, library, bar. […] I got myself in quite a pat-
tern really. […] I have been pretty disciplined. (Alan, student) 
 
This example illustrates the differences between the students’ everyday lives and their 
patterns of time work or their “time styles” (Cotte/Ratneshwar 2001). Alan displays a 
pronounced planning orientation and an analytic time style dividing his everyday time 
in small chunks, whereas Emily practices a holistic time style thinking of the day in 
larger chunks and not extensively planning it (ibid., 400). Stressing her spontaneous 
way of organising her everyday life, Emily reports she often experiences agentic 
boredom. By contrast, Alan explicitly considers boredom as a failure to anticipate the 
organisation of contrast experiences:  
 
Boredom is […] if you don’t organise your day […] and you wake up and 
you’ve got nothing to do. And then you’re trying to organise your day on the 
day. (Alan, student) 
 
Similar differences in time styles have been observed in other samples wherein indi-
viduals live under conditions of weak temporal constraints, such as freelancers. So, 
even in the pre-work life stage, agentic time work leads to highly disparate time and 
boredom experiences. Even extensive time planning cannot always prevent the feeling 
of boredom. In the students’ accounts, particularly the absence of meaningful interac-
tion and the experience of loneliness, e.g. during holidays when significant others are 
not available, external limits to the success of time work are represented.  
From a life course perspective the experience of agentic boredom is likely to be 
most prevalent in the pre- and post-work stages of a biography: that is in youth and 
old age. The opposite almost certainly applies to the experience of situational bore-
dom. Nonetheless, agentic processes that are both individual efforts to organise time 
and subjective differences in experiencing time interact with the effect of life stage 
parameters. 
 
Agentic boredom and life transitions 
Life transitions characteristically bring about a change in everyday routines. Think 
here of leaving home, moving in with a partner, the birth of a child, the “empty nest” 
                                                          
8 What Marie Jahoda (1981) proposed with regard to the results of the famous Marienthalstudie from the 
1930s, is not true: the objective deprivation of the time structures of work does not necessarily and by 
all means lead to boredom and mental health impairments. Jahoda’s assumption is an empirically falsi-
fied, sociological reductionism (Rogge 2012). It is erroneous because it blends out individual’s agentic 
efforts to organise their time. 
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syndrome, the loss of a spouse etc. Life transitions typically require the individual to 
establish, habitualise, and internalise new routines. For a moment, at least, ontological 
security is in danger, as long as new routines have not been established. Consequent-
ly, as indicated in the numerous interviews I have conducted with unemployed per-
sons, life transitions often give rise to an increased experience of agentic boredom, as 
unemployment frequently entails subjective disorientation concerning how to re-
schedule one’s time and restructure the daily flow of activities:  
 
I mean, who would feel like hanging around inside all day long. […] I do not 
know what I should do, apart from, you know, going to work [laughs] (Mariah, 
short-term unemployed) 
 
Asked for the most important change in her life brought about by job loss, another 
participant answered:  
 
I got bored. I had to reschedule my time. […] it was simply boring, really bor-
ing. Nothing to do. The housework was done very quickly, my husband was at 
work, my daughter at school, the little ones were either playing or we did 
something together, tinkering or some-thing. But you can‘t do that every day 
and it does get really boring at some point. And reading all day long or doing 
whatever else, watching TV, I’m not really that kind of type. (Martha, short-
term unemployed) 
 
The breakdown of habitualised routines that had previously guaranteed a minimum of 
contrast experience leads to the experience of agentic boredom after job loss. It is the 
feeling that one is incapable of fabricating the experience of contrast that is so worry-
ing. Interestingly, and again refuting the over-romantic view of work proposed by 
Jahoda and others, this is much less the case with people who decide to quit their jobs 
themselves. Having anticipated the need to actively restructure their activities they are 
characteristically better able to fill their time. Some, for instance, report extensive 
leisure activities such as attending language classes and cultural events, playing 
sports, socialising etc. However, to interpret this within a situational determinism 
would be mistaken. Martha, for instance, tells us about her agentic adaptation to the 
initially boring experience of unemployment:  
 
And then I decided as soon as the children go to the play school […] at school, 
there is a cafeteria, and they are always in need of mothers to help out, make 
sandwiches, sell stuff, and so on. So I said, okay, as long as I do not work and 
am not having anything else to do, that‘d be it. Go there, you will get to know 
some people, that will make a change. No sooner said than done. And this is 
what I am now doing four times a week. (Martha, short-term unemployed) 
 
After she has been struggling with the restructuration of her everyday life, she choos-
es to develop a new routine by committing herself to a voluntary engagement. This 
reincreases her experience of contrast and reduces her boredom experience which, as 
she accentuates in the interview, had become a psychological burden to her. Taking 
on the voluntary commitment, she says, has improved her well-being. 
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In contrast to this, another interview participant who quit his job voluntarily and 
has been enjoying his everyday life with many leisure activities, such as cycling and 
jogging in the preceding eight months, is aware that this state might change and bore-
dom might creep in at some point: 
 
I am not bored [...] I‘d say […], it has not come that far yet, that I, how to say, 
sit at the kitchen table all day long and look out of the window. [laughs]. [...] I 
think, with some people that happens, but not yet with me. (Bernd, short-term 
unemployed) 
 
Hence, the experience of agentic boredom emerges whenever subjects cannot draw on 
pertinent practices to level out their experience of a lack of contrast. The necessity to 
restructure one’s everyday routines, then, is what makes the experience of agentic 
boredom likely during life transitions. Of course, the restructuring of practices occurs 
within a dynamic process that can include both “successful” adaptation and failure.  
The empirical studies I conducted only relate to job loss as one exemplary life 
transition. However, other life transitions, as mentioned above, entail comparable 
restructurings of practices. It is thus probable that they have similar effects on the 
experience of agentic boredom. This is visible, for instance, in the “empty nest” syn-
drome in which the parents, notably the mothers, need to reorganise their daily rou-
tines. This often goes along with boredom experiences and, in the long run, a sense of 
decreased well-being. This can be seen as a dynamic process of change of routines 
and potential adaptation. To many people, job loss is a major loss of ontological secu-
rity and initially a breakdown of everyday routines. As the situation persists, people 
are more likely to adapt and rebalance their contrast experiences in everyday life as 
quantitative well-being studies confirm (e.g. Lucas 2007). In many cases, however, 
the restructuration of routines fails and boredom experiences persist and accumulate. 
 
Habitus formation and life-long socialisation processes 
While psychologists have investigated boredom as “boredom proneness”, that is a 
stable personality trait, some sociological scholars have suggested that boredom expe-
riences are more likely in certain social milieus than in others. For example, Schulze 
(2005) argued what he called the “entertainment milieu”, notably teenagers and ado-
lescents with low education demonstrated a strong need for diversion and a deep 
anxiety towards the experience of boredom and monotony. In this context, it is very 
useful to take up Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Famously, Bourdieu has delivered 
extensive evidence for differential habitus formation including leisure activities and 
techniques of coping with everyday life that differ immensely across social milieus. In 
this vein it is plausible, as evoked earlier, to assume an unequal distribution of skills 
to perform time work and of ways to perceive time including the capacity to avoid 
experiencing agentic boredom. These capacities and patterns are acquired from early 
socialisation on.  
I should like to exemplify this point with one skill that is specifically relevant to 
the experience of boredom: the skill to deal with privacy. Not only are upper and 
middle class children better instructed to manage their everyday lives in general, but 
in particular working class children are also often less trained in performing routines 
of how to be on their own. Some thoughts of Randall Collins are useful here. He pro-
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poses that devoid of the bodily presence of others we experience “no heightened emo-
tional energy […] or worse, a sense of a drag, the feeling of boredom and constraint” 
(Collins 2004, 51). 
Yet, obviously boredom does not necessarily emerge when we are by ourselves. 
Collins suggests that when being alone we may perform what he calls “rituals of self-
solidarity” (ibid.). These “mental routines” can consist of all sorts of activities such as 
playing sports, chess or an instrument, singing, reading, meditating, reflecting, pray-
ing, writing etc. Such self-solidarising practices are of great relevance in the avoid-
ance of experiencing agentic boredom. For aloneness and agentic boredom are closely 
intertwined. When “rituals of self-solidarity” cannot be drawn on in situations of 
aloneness, then what people often experience is agentic boredom: “Some reach high 
degrees of solidarity with oneself; at these moments, one feels focused, directional, 
and most clearly conscious. At other moments […] inner interaction rituals do not 
come together: thought is episodic, scattered, inarticulate.”  (Collins 2004, 219 f.). 
Notwithstanding Collins’s specific theoretical approach, what is crucial to my ar-
gument here is that the capacity to organise one’s time experience in a fulfilling way 
when alone is likely to be more extensively trained in the upper classes than in the 
working classes. This includes the capacity to exercise time work. Consequently, 
habitus, as it were, encompasses skills to prevent and deal with the experience of 
agentic boredom. 
Habitus is formed throughout socialisation which is a life-long process. Not only 
are working class people at a greater risk of receiving less training in boredom-
relevant skills from their parents. But they are also more likely to have unstable work 
and family biographies. Unstable life conditions and critical life events such as pre-
carious employment, unemployment, divorce and the like, however, bring about the 
break-up of everyday routines. This further hampers the development and habitualisa-
tion of practices that are necessary to avoid agentic boredom. 
While stable biographies with long-term working contracts and few job changes 
are perhaps formed by a greater experience of situational boredom, unstable, discon-
tinuous work biographies, long-term unemployment and highly discontinuous family 
trajectories are potentially associated with the experience of agentic boredom. In 
many cases, agentic boredom then becomes an iterative part of people’s everyday life 
often going along with or leading to problems of daily identity work. The long-term 
unemployed persons I interviewed gave impressive examples of this. Although they 
have been in continuous unemployment for years, they still frequently experience 
agentic boredom, meaning that their attempts to adopt and establish routines that 
deliver them with sufficient contrast experiences continue to fail. As Fabian remarks:  
 
Unemployment makes life meaningless […] you bum around all day long. (Fa-
bian, long-term unemployed) 
 
Fabian’s statement reflects a meaninglessness that has become a routinised yet plagu-
ing part of his everyday life. In fact, the pattern of “killing time” then often forms part 
of everyday routines as indicated in the following interview extract. 
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You have nothing to do. So, then you have nothing to do and you wonder 
‘What shall I do?’ Do something! Do anything! What? Do some practicing. 
Some finger exercises. With the computer. (Horst, long-term unemployed) 
 
Here, the despair with which Horst is looking for activities to keep up the continuity 
of everyday practices is highly visible. My point is that rather than being born as 
member of a “bored class”, as implied by a rigid and reifying habitus concept, it is the 
habitus formation in conjunction with life-long, dynamic socialisation processes that 
lead to the repetitive, cumulative experience of agentic boredom, probably being most 
prominent in the working class. This likely makes for the social inequality of agentic 
boredom experiences. 
 
Agentic boredom and late modernity 
Finally, a major topic in both time and life course sociology is the analysis of socio-
historical change. What Simmel (1903/1997) famously referred to as the “blasé atti-
tude” in modern metropolitans has been related to the experience of boredom by con-
temporary authors (Aho 2007). The blasé attitude is described as follows: “The nerves 
find in the refusal to react to their stimulation the last possibility of accommodating to 
the contents and forms of metropolitan life.” (Simmel 1903/1997, 179) 
Simmel (ibid.) attributes the development of a blasé attitude to the quantitative in-
tensification of the stimulation of the nervous system in the city. In other words, the 
explosive growth of external stimuli and the immense acceleration of multiple social, 
technological and other developments leads to a “cognitive overload” (Klapp 1986) 
and consequently to a deadening of the nervous system. Aho (2007), as much as 
Klapp (1986), considers this cognitive overstimulation as a central source of boredom. 
Contrast experiences, we could say along these grounds, decline when the number of 
stimuli has risen to such a point that they can hardly be discerned any more. Cognitive 
time research confirms that both cognitive overload and under-stimulation are poten-
tial sources of subjective boredom (Wittmann 2009). 
Other authors have emphasised the growing “cultural arrhythmia” (Brissett/Snow 
1993) as leading to an increased experience of boredom. Likewise, Rosa (2009) holds 
the social acceleration responsible for an increase in the experience of boredom and 
inertia. The “desynchronized high-speed society”, he contends, leads to an increase in 
the subjective experience of “frantic change and temporalized time [giving] way to 
the perception of ‘frozen time’ without (a meaningful) past and future and conse-
quently of depressing inertia” (Rosa 2009, 101). 
While I agree that the consequences of social acceleration are paramount, I accen-
tuate a somewhat different account of contemporary boredom. First, I would like to 
stress that there are still no representative empirical data that describe a longitudinal, 
let alone historical rise in boredom experiences. While there are good reasons to as-
sume such an increase in agentic boredom, we should still be cautious as assessments 
of contemporary time and culture often fall prey to observational distortions. Second, 
it is indispensable to differentiate between the experience of situational boredom and 
the experience of agentic boredom when speculating about sociohistorical change. In 
a way, the two types could not differ more. When discussing the sociocultural dimen-
sion of situational boredom, we need to refer to external situations, life situations, 
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work and family conditions, political conditions, etc., whereas when dealing with 
changes in agentic boredom experiences we are concerned with transformations of 
individuals’ skills to fabricate contrast experiences and manage their identity process. 
In the latter case, I hold, we must thus analyse alterations of internal, psychosocial 
structures.  
Third, regarding this I think the observation of individualisation processes and the 
historical rise of reflexivity (Giddens 1991) has a strong explanatory potential. Agen-
tic boredom is a practical disfluency and a, albeit ephemeral, hiatus of the identity 
process. It characteristically contains the reflexive problematisation of the self. The 
very phenomenon of agentic boredom goes back to our increased possibility and need 
to constantly choose and decide what to do, and to the decreased clarity of what we 
are to do. If situational boredom was perhaps characteristic of modernity as the era of 
self-disciplination (Foucault) and the “iron cage” (Weber) of the “institutional pro-
gramme” (Kaufmann), then agentic boredom can be contextualised as symptomatic of 
the era of late modernity. Late modernity, which Giddens and Beck both call “reflex-
ive modernity”, is characterised by the permanent need to construct oneself and to 
exercise daily identity work. Not all the time, but clearly more often than previously, 
people are wondering “What shall I do?”. It is indeed this decline of predefined rou-
tines and action patterns that plays an important part in the sociohistorical dimension 
of the experience of agentic boredom.  
This latter idea links up with an argument made by Ehrenberg (2010). He suggests 
that in modernity depression was thought of as resulting from a neurotic conflict that 
is a deviation from disciplinary norms. In late modernity, however, depression is 
considered to result from a feeling of individual insufficiency that is a failure at realis-
ing individual self-determination and autonomy. Thus, the grown need to construct 
and enact an autonomic self-determined identity is considered as a major origin of the 
explosive growth in the prevalence of depressive disorders. I am not convinced that 
this argument applies to depression in terms of clinical pathology for “weariness of 
the self” and psychiatric disorders are different phenomena. However, the weariness 
Ehrenberg refers to and the agentic boredom described here might emerge from the 
same late modern challenge that is the daily fulfilment of identity work. Agentic 
boredom, then, is perhaps one characteristic emotion of late modernity. 
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